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NO TES
vided for a conviction of grand larceny under the consolidated statute.30 Hence a defendant suspected of obtaining property by false
pretenses is subject to the whim of the prosecutor, who may now
prosecute under either statute.
In conclusion, the provision for a general charge under the consolidated statute is in keeping with the modem trend toward streamlining indictments and informations in order that the trial may proceed speedily to a decision on the merits. In keeping with the purpose
for which the statute was enacted, Florida prosecutors should be able
to employ the general charge to the same advantage as is done in
California, Louisiana, and Massachusetts, the states chiefly responsible
for the position that a general allegation with respect to any one of
the crimes embodied in the statute is sufficient for pleading purposes.
HENRY F. MARTIN, JR.

GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF
BILLBOARD ADVERTISING
Outdoor advertising is a big business, firmly entrenched and well
organized. It has unquestionably made a real contribution to the
opening of mass markets, upon which our economy is dependent. Like
other behemoths of commerce, however, its development has not been
hailed by everyone. The very number of billboards is bound to offend
some; there are hundreds of thousands in the nation, ranging in
size from Burma Shave jingles to the multi-thousand-dollar sparkling
displays on the Miami bay front.
There is an attempt, fairly successful among members of the organized industry, at self-regulation. One of the rules in the Outdoor
Advertising Association code of ethics' is "to refuse to display any
misleading, indecent or illegitimate advertising or any advertising
which savors of personal animosity." Bylaws of the association are
rigid on the subject of location. Members are not permitted to place
billboards
3oFLA. STAT. §811.021 (1955) (offense divided into petit and grand larceny.
Maximum punishment for former, 6 months in county jail or fine not exceeding
$300; for latter, 5 years in state penitentiary or fine not exceeding $1,000).
IOUTDOOR ADVERTISING: THE MoDERN MARKETING FORCE 209 (1928).
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"(1) so as to create a hazard to traffic,
(2) on rocks, posts, trees, fences, barricades or daubs,
(8) on streets or portions of streets which are purely residential
in their nature, or in other locations where the resentment
of reasonably minded persons would be justified,
(4) on streets facing public parks where the surrounding streets
are residential,
(5) on any locations except property either owned or leased,
(6) in locations that interfere with the view of natural scenic
beauty spots."
Even assuming strict compliance with the code of ethics and bylaws,
however, the "reasonably minded persons" of (3)above might differ as
to the definition of "natural scenic beauty spots" of (6). Is the Everglades of Florida a river of grass, flush with exotic flora and fauna, or
is it a dreadfully monotonous stretch of saw grass to be traversed
before arrival at a winter playground? Legislative bodies have attempted to resolve some of the conflicts that have arisen with the
development of this vast industry.
Ti

LEGAL BAsis

The regulation of billboards by a municipality or a state is historically based upon the promotion of public safety, convenience,
and morals - a legitimate exercise of the police power to regulate the
use of public ways. 2
In Cusack Co. v. Chicago3 the United States Supreme Court decided
that an ordinance requiring the erector of a billboard to get the permission of all property owners in the block was not offensive. The Supreme Court struck down the contention that this was an improper
delegation of legislative authority to private individuals; it reasoned
that an absolute prohibition of billboards would have been constitutional, and hence the owner was benefited in being allowed to erect
the noxious structures under any circumstances. The police power
supporting this decision was based on the following rather tenuous
4
ground:
"[T]he Supreme Court finds that fires had been started in the
2MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §24.380 (3d ed. 1949).
3242 U.S. 526 (1916).
4Id. at 529.
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accumulation of combustible material which gathered about
such billboards; that offensive and insanitary accumulations
are habitually found about them, and that they afford a convenient concealment and shield for immoral practices, and for
loiterers and criminals."
Aesthetic Considerations
The hornbook rule is that aesthetic considerations are not enough
to uphold billboard regulation. 5 This rule is based on the supposition
that, since there is a right to devote one's property to reasonable use,
a regulation not based on the police power deprives one of property
without just compensation and is thus a denial of due process. The
authority cited for this hornbook statement, however, is less than satisfactory.
Though the United States Supreme Court has never held that
billboard regulation may not be upheld on aesthetic considerations
alone, the point is probably moot; it is likely that the Supreme Court
would avoid the issue by finding a reasonable exercise of the police
power if the state court were wise enough to place its holding on alternative grounds. The Supreme Court has upheld an ordinance that
entirely excluded billboards from certain zoned areas. 6
One of the leading cases stressing aesthetic considerations is General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Indianapolis.7 The Indiana court in
upholding a billboard ordinance, although primarily relying on the
police power, stated:8
"But aesthetic considerations enter in to a great extent, as an
auxiliary consideration, where the regulation has a real or
reasonable relation to the safety, health, morals, or general welfare, ... ; and, where a regulation of billboards does not apply
to an entire city, but merely applies to billboards in close
proximity to public parks and boulevards, it may properly have
a relation to the public health, comfort, and welfare which it
would not otherwise possess."
In a case that went even further the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
§24.382 (3d ed. 1949).
GVillage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
7202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1930).
SId. at 95, 172 N.E. at 312.
5MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
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Court stated that "grounds of fitness and taste" constituted sufficient
reason to forbid renewal of a license to erect billboards in certain
areas.9 In an exhaustive review of the aesthetic considerations angle,
Professor Gardner, of Harvard Law School, praised the Massachusetts
decision and encouraged those states in which the problem is still unsettled to sustain billboard regulation on aesthetic grounds alone.' 0
FLORIDA REGULATION

The earliest case involving billboard regulation in Florida, and
one of the leading cases in the country, is Anderson v. Shackelford."
A Lake City ordinance forbade the erection of any billboard more
than six feet high or within ten feet of the sidewalk without permission
of the city council. The city authorities tried to apply the regulation
to a sign painted on the side of a building, but the Florida Supreme
12
Court refused to uphold the regulation:
"In so far as the city undertakes to regulate the erection or construction of billboards that might be dangerous to the public
by falling or being blown down, or constructed of such material
and in such manner as to endanger life or property, or to increase the danger of loss by fire, or to have printed or displayed
upon them obscene characters and words tending to injure and
offend public morals, it has the power; but to attempt to exercise the power of depriving one of the legitimate use of his property merely because such use offends the aesthetic or refined
taste of other persons is quite another thing, and cannot be
exercised under the constitution forbidding the taking of property for a public use without compensation."
The issue of billboard legislation was again before the Florida
Supreme Court in the companion cases of John H. Swisher & Son, Inc;
v. Johnson 3 and Hay-A-Tampa Cigar Co. v. Johnson.- The plaintiffs
attacked the constitutionality of an act 5 that forbade the erection of
oGeneral Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works, 389 Mass.
149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935).
'oThe Massachusetts Billboard Decision, 49 HARY. L. Rav. 869 (1936).
1174 Fla. 36, 76 So. 343 (1917).
12Id. at 43, 76 So. at 345.
"3149 Fla. 132, 5 So.2d 441 (1941).
'4149 Fla. 148, 5 So.2d 433 (1941).
'5Now FLA. STAT. §479 (1955).
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a billboard within fifteen feet of any highway outside the corporate
limits of a city or town. The primary basis for attack was that the
statute constituted an unreasonable taking not related to the police
power. The majority of the Court upheld the statute as a reasonable
exercise of police power: 16
"A purpose and intent of the statute is to prevent commercial and other advertising signboards being maintained near
the public highways so as to attract the attention of drivers of
rapidly moving motor vehicles and others on the public highways of the state ....
Such signboards obviously increase the
hazards and risks of public travel on the highways and dearly
justify the statutory regulations under the police power which
are here challenged."
In a concurring opinion Mr. Chief Justice Brown stated that the regulation had no real relation to public safety and made a sensible appraisal of the statute's function:"
"Can the act be upheld upon the ground that the legislature
has the right to protect the traveling public from artificial
obstructions to the view of the scenic beauties of Florida, which
otherwise might be seen and enjoyed, not only by tourists
visiting our State, but also by our own citizens, where such
obstructions are not an absolute necessity and are erected for
business reasons, such as the signs and sign boards dealt with
in this act? I strongly suspect that, although no mention is made
of it in the act, this was one of the main purposes of this
statute.... I think the time has come to make a candid avowal
of the right of the legislature to adopt appropriate legislation
based on these so called aesthetic, but really very practical,
grounds."
Mr. Chief Justice Brown's persuasion bore fruit in 1953 in Merritt v. Peters.28 The Legislature had passed a special act giving the
Dade County Commission power to zone generally; in exercising this
power the Commission had provided that commercial signs should
be limited to forty square feet. The appellant-petitioner sought a
26149 Fla. 148, 161, 5 So.2d 433, 438 (1941).
171d. at 165, 5 So.2d at 439.
2865 So.2d 861 (Fla. 1953).
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determination that the regulation was invalid, basing his attack on
the fact that none of the familiar elements that warrant zoning - public health, morals, safety, and welfare - were present. Mr. Justice
Thomas stated the somewhat revolutionary principle of the case as
follows: 19
"We have no hesitancy in agreeing with him [the petitioner]
that the factors of health, safety and morals are not involved
in restricting the proportions of a sign board, but we disagree
with him in his position that the restriction cannot be sustained
on aesthetic grounds alone ....

All in the area are regulated

alike in the use of their property in constructing signs; all will
profit if all obey; all will suffer if none is restricted."
Mr. Justice Barns dissented, citing Anderson v. Shackelford and the
weight of authority elsewhere as against the decision. The Merritt
case can thus be regarded as overruling the Anderson case and aligning
Florida with the progressive minority allowing billboard regulation
for aesthetic reasons.
Merritt v. Peters has been cited 20 as the first American case upholding billboard regulation on aesthetic grounds alone, and the
decision is saluted as forward for recognizing that aesthetic considerations have as much meaning as most of the police power labels courts
have used in upholding such regulation. Though a revolutionary
decision, it has not had a revolutionary effect on billboard regulation
in Florida. One case decided after Merritt v. Peters in an inferior court
apparently failed to recognize the new importance of aesthetic considerations in billboard regulation. In Surfside v. McGlynn 2 1 the
defendant was acquitted in municipal court of violating an ordinance
forbidding certain signs, since the sign in issue was inside defendant's
building. The court stated that the ordinance could not affect interior signs and cited at great length from Anderson v. Shackelford
in ruling that aesthetic considerations alone would not sanction unreasonable restrictions relating to the erection and maintenance of
billboards. The decision is especially poor in light of the fact that
Surfside is a town of some scenic beauty and a sign visible from the
street is no less obnoxious because it is in a window.
19ld. at 862.
2029 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1017 (1954).
215 Fla. Supp. 194 (1954).
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The Merritt case was cited in Scoville v. Miami Springs,22 in which
a limitation on the size of gasoline signs was held invalid and unconstitutional. The decision can be explained by the additional facts
that the gas station owner's income was substantially reduced, and
the city failed to show that aesthetic considerations justified the regulation; in the regulated commercial area there were many signs larger
than the one the defendant was convicted of displaying. Hence to
sustain a regulation on aesthetic grounds it may be necessary to show
that the regulation bears some relation to the intrinsic beauty of the
surroundings.
The aesthetic ground is not vital to the continued regulation of
billboards; the police power could have been used even in the Merritt
case on the specious ground that a larger sign is more dangerous in
a high wind. All of the regulations in the city and county codes of
Florida can be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power.
SAMPLE REGULATIONS

The outstanding characteristic of municipal billboard regulation
in Florida is its lack of uniformity. Although the applicable ordinances vary widely from city to city, there is a fairly high incidence of
regulation. Of sixteen codes examined only four have no billboard
regulation whatever.
Some of the city regulations can be sustained on the basis of safety
regulation. For example, Delray Beach prohibits only those billboards
within twenty-five feet of an intersection.23 To a similar prohibition
Bradenton adds a proscription against putting signs on the tops of
buildings.2 4 Pensacola limits only those billboards made of combustible material and those to a height of six feet. 25 Tallahassee 26 and Daytona Beach 27 regulate only signs that dangerously overhang a sidewalk. Sarasota forbids the erection of a sign near a corner or on public
property, such as a park or a playground.28
West Palm Beach extensively regulates all signs.29 Billboards are
So.2d 188 (FIa. 1955).
23Delray Beach City Code, c. 1, §2 (1937).
24Bradenton City Code, §3.1 (1951).
25Pensacola Code of Ordinances §150 (1920).
2OTallahassee Code of Ordinances §249 (1944).
27Daytona Beach City Code, c. 2, §9 (1946).
2
8Sarasota City Code, c. 2, §I (1950).
29NVest Palm Beach City Code §§3.36-.40 (1948).
2281
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totally prohibited in residential areas, and in blocks where apartments constitute a majority of the buildings. They are further pro.
hibited within 100 feet of hotels and apartments and within 200 feet
of schools, parks, playgrounds, and cemeteries. The person maintaining the billboard is kept strictly responsible for keeping the area
free from trash and other insanitary accumulations.
Jacksonville and Miami have enacted similar ordinances for the
purpose of protecting their respective skylines. Jacksonville prohibits
the erection of billboards taller than thirty feet from grade level
but allows a roof sign to be erected to a horrendous seventy-five feet
above the level of the roof. 30 Miami forbids a sign more than twenty

feet over grade and more than twenty-five feet over a roof top. 31
Miami Beach has perhaps the most stringent and most successful
laws regulating billboards.32 All signs are extensively regulated as to
height, construction, and material; a permit must be secured and a
license fee paid for each sign erected. No signs at all are permitted
in a single-family district, and billboards of the usual type are generally
prohibited:
"No signs of any kind will be permitted except in connection
with the advertisement of the particular building or property
on which the sign is located or of some merchandise or service
dispensed or rendered on the same premises on which the sign
is located."
The city ordinances further impose a fine of up to $1,000 or imprisonment not to exceed ninety days, and each day a sign is maintained
in violation of an order to remove it constitutes a separate offense.
The Miami Beach ordinance is an extreme example of zoning for
aesthetic reasons, but apparently no one has tested its constitutionality
in court.
Regulation by taxation is apparently the most serious potential
threat to the outdoor advertising industry.-' There is no clear evidence
of an attempt by Florida municipalities to regulate billboards by taxation, though several cities fix rates that increase according to the size
of the billboard. For example, St. Petersburg charges nothing for a
3oJacksonville City Code c. 10, §100 (1942).
3'Miami Building Code, c. 47 (1936).
32Miami Beach City Code, c. 32 (1950).
3

3 AGNEW, OuTDooR ADvaRisING 234

(1938).
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sign under sixty square feet, .55.00 from 60 to 420 square feet, and
$30.00 for a sign in excess of 420 square feet. 34 The taxation of billboards is a source of revenue that hard pressed municipalities may
have overlooked. The Miami Herald35 pointed out that the city leased
space for fifteen signs for an annual rent of $385.00, while the sign
company collected a cool $20,972 per year from the signs. In view
of the unfavored place billboards seem to hold in the judicial view,
it is likely that increased taxation of billboards would be adjudged
reasonable.
CONCLUSION

A study of the impact of outdoor advertising on the American
economy indicates that both its regulation and the continued performance of its marketing function are matters of public concern. The
day is probably past when governments will attempt to destroy billboards by harassing legislation. It is undeniable, however, that excessive commercialism detracts from the beauties of the state and is
very offensive to some aesthetically sensitive souls. In enforcing the
various laws regulating the industry, the large concerns should not
be the primary target. It seems that the most egregious offenders are
the one-business advertisers with their profusion of shoddy homemade
signs or their monstrosities of peeling paint.
The Legislature should incorporate minimum standards of construction and maintenance of billboards on state highways into the
general statute. 36 For those communities without regulation the lead
of the Florida Supreme Court should be followed; since aesthetics
alone will sustain a billboard regulation, the sun-drenched tourist
havens can go all the way in eliminating objectionable outdoor advertising.
JERRY

B.

CROCKE'Tr

34St. Petersburg Revised Ordinances, c. 2, §§4-16 (1946).
35June 25, 1954, p. lb.
36FLA. STAT. §479 (1955).
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